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Abstract
This article examines the complexities around fiscal federalism in Nigeria 
within the framework of the resource curse thesis. Nigeria is an oil-rich 
federation yet governments at all levels perform poorly. State governments 
continually experience fiscal gap and deficiency in service delivery. Not only 
that, the vast majority of the citizens live under the twin burden of poverty and 
unemployment. The inability of the Nigerian state to address these challenges, 
despite the huge oil revenue, contributes to the continuous debates over the 
value of the country's fiscal system. The article contributes to the understanding 
of how Nigeria's oil-centric economy shapes the fiscal system. It argues that the 
failure of oil resources to generate economic prosperity in the states is rooted 
in the flawed fiscal system that encourages the sharing of the oil wealth rather 
than economic production at the state level. The article recommends a more 
functional fiscal federalism that would recognise the fiscal autonomy of the 
tiers of government. That is, a fiscal system with less reliance on the centrally-
generated oil revenue.
Keywords: Nigeria; Fiscal Federalism; Resource Curse; Resource Abundance; 
Oil Dependence.
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1. Introduction
If we accept that fiscal federalism is a function of the national political 
economy that highlights the fundamental features of a federation (Burgess, 
2006: 148), it, therefore, follows that there is a nexus between fiscal federalism 
and economic development of a given federation. There is also a relationship 
between resource abundance and economic prosperity or a lack of it. Nigeria, 
for example, is an oil-rich federation, yet the country’s economic story has 
been that of increasing poverty, unemployment and lack of economic growth. 
Moreover, state governments have continued to perform poorly in terms of 
service delivery. Between 2015 and 2016, state governments experienced 
some financial glitch, which arose from the drop in federal allocations, which 
in turn resulted from the fall in the price of oil in the global market. The federal 
government had to provide some bailout funds to the distressed states. Since 
then, state governors have not ceased to clamour for more bailout, arguing that 
their states’ accounts are unendingly in red. They have ceaselessly blamed the 
states’ continuous inability to balance their budgets on the lopsided nature of 
the revenue allocation system in which the federal government is allocated 
the lion’s share of the national wealth. This sharing arrangement has largely 
contributed to the clamour for fiscal decentralisation. 
In Nigeria, the states experience fiscal problems on a regular basis. One 
obvious reason for this is the inherent economic disparity among the states of the 
federation. Not all the states are blessed with natural resources. Another reason is 
the variation in the population. Yet another cause of this problem is the revenue 
allocation system which strongly favours the centre to the detriment of the sub-
national tiers (state and local governments). These problems have contributed 
to the culture of fiscal dependence in the federation. Fiscal federalism is 
characteristically intended to achieve the overall national socio-economic growth 
of the federation, as well as a balanced federation. The question, therefore is: 
despite Nigeria’s colossal oil wealth, has fiscal federalism achieved this twin 
objective? Another basic principle of federalism is that the fiscal system must 
ensure self-sufficiency of the constituent units. Has the fiscal system been able to 
guarantee self-sufficiency at the state level? The overarching research question, 
therefore is: what is the nature of fiscal federalism in Nigeria and does fiscal 
federalism impact on development given the country’s resource abundance? The 
purpose of this article, therefore, is to answer these pertinent questions. 
The remainder of the article is organised into five sections. The first section 
examines the conceptual meaning of fiscal federalism and resource curse. 
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Exploring the meaning of these concepts helps to lay a foundation for the paper. 
The second section provides an overview of the character of Nigeria’s fiscal 
federalism. This contributes to our understanding of how the country’s wealth 
is distributed among the three tiers of government – the federal, state and local 
governments. In the third section, the paper examines why Nigeria epitomises 
the resource curse phenomenon. The fourth section basically focuses on the 
dilemma of Nigeria’s fiscal federalism. The section principally discusses 
how oil abundance constitutes a curse rather than a blessing in the oil-rich 
federation. Finally, the fifth section is the conclusion. This section argues that 
Nigeria’s oil is a curse and if the curse is to be reversed, the fiscal system must 
guarantee states’ fiscal autonomy. 
2. Fiscal federalism and resource curse: conceptual meaning
Fiscal federalism 
According to Oates (1999: 1120), “fiscal federalism addresses the vertical 
structure of the public sector”, as well as “explores the roles of the different 
levels of government” and this includes their relationship through such 
instruments as inter-governmental grants. Similarly, for Freinkman (2008: 153), 
fiscal federalism “defines the core rules for resource allocation, distribution of 
responsibilities for service delivery, and mechanisms for interaction between 
different tiers of government”. Thus, fiscal federalism basically refers to the 
allocation of tax/revenue powers and expenditure responsibilities or the sharing 
of a federation’s fiscal resources among the different tiers of government that 
make up the federation. It is typified by fiscal relations between the national 
and the sub-national governments. As Babalola (2019: 81) argued, a fiscal 
system should ensure that the sharing of revenue between the federal and state 
governments corresponds with the distribution of constitutional functions. 
Scholars have noted that two factors usually influence the distribution of 
responsibilities in a federation: the benefits from collective action; and economies 
of scale (Anderson 2010: 9-18; Ekpo 2006: 210; Galadima 2008: 57-58). Thus, 
the federal government should be assigned those functions that benefit the 
whole national population, and those of local nature should be assigned to state 
and local governments. In other words, the federal government should provide 
such goods and services as policing and defence, because these benefits every 
citizen in the country. Managing fiscal relations is a daunting task, especially in 
a resource-rich federation such as Nigeria. Since no single fiscal theory has yet 
been developed to manage fiscal relations, federations put in place mechanisms 
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deemed suitable to their circumstances. In Nigeria, an independent fiscal 
body, the National Revenue Mobilisation, Allocation and Fiscal Commission 
(NRMAFC), established in 1989, reviews the revenue-sharing formula and 
also advises the presidency on the sharing of national revenues deposited in a 
general distributable pool called the Federation Account. 
Fiscal federalism or simply, the fiscal relationship among the levels of 
government can be explained using three theories – the theory of "fiscal location" 
which is concerned with the functions expected to be performed by each level 
of government, the theory of "inter-jurisdictional co-operation" which refers to 
areas of shared responsibility by different levels of government, and the theory 
of "multi-jurisdictional community" where each jurisdiction provides public 
services whose benefit will accrue to people within its boundaries. However, 
the central challenge of fiscal federalism in Nigeria lies in the equity of the 
fiscal expenditure assignment and revenue raising functions of the three tiers 
of government (Babalola, 2019: 88-92). In Nigeria, fiscal responsibility and 
revenue powers are considerably centralised, wherein, the states and local 
governments are left with meagre sources. 
So, of what relevance is fiscal federalism? According to Watts (2003: 2), the 
significance of fiscal federalism in any federation derives from the fact that, 
financial resources: 
“Play a large part in determining the relative political and economic roles and 
influence of the different governments within the polity; are a major means for 
facilitating flexibility and adjustment; and shape public attitudes about the costs 
and benefits of the activities of different governments”.
Moreover, a federation’s revenue allocation system is typically designed to 
achieve a balanced federation in which components of the federation get relative 
treatment. This is not the case in Nigeria where state governments experience 
perpetual fiscal gap and compellingly depend on the federal government for 
sustenance. As Ekpo (2006) argued, fiscal federalism in Nigeria has emanated 
from historical, economic, political, geographical, cultural and social factors. 
It is, therefore, the interplay of these factors that constantly generates the 
dynamics which characterise the practice of fiscal federalism in the country.
Resource Curse 
Notable scholars have argued that there exists an inverse relationship between 
natural resources and economic development (Auty, 1993; Sachs & Warner, 
1997; Ross, 1999). For these scholars, resource wealth is a curse and not a 
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blessing. The concept of “resource curse” was developed in 1993 by an 
economic geographer, Richard Auty to describe the idea that the abundance of 
natural resources is indeed a curse rather than a blessing to a country. For Auty 
(1993:1) “resource curse is the phenomenon of worse economic performance 
in resource-abundant countries compared to resource-poor countries”. In other 
words, resource curse means that the abundance of natural resources by a 
particular country may not necessarily translate into economic success. 
For Ross (1999), the negative correlation between resource wealth and 
economic growth is rooted in the following: firstly, resource exporters often 
experience a fall in terms of trade for primary commodities, which widens 
the gap between primary commodity exporters and the rich industrialised 
states; secondly, the instability of international commodity markets does 
have negative impacts on domestic economies; thirdly, countries endowed 
with abundant natural resources tend to neglect other sectors; fourthly, there 
exist poor economic linkages between resource and non-resource sectors of 
the economy; fifthly, resource abundance causes policymakers to become 
irrational and short-sighted, and consequently make poor decisions; sixthly, 
resource state booms have a tendency to weaken state institutions; and 
seventhly, abundant natural resources tend to enrich state officeholders, who 
favour policies that are antithetical to growth (pp. 298-309). Following from 
the above, resource curse may be described as a phenomenon associated with 
resource-rich countries with poor developmental outcomes. The afore-stated 
political and economic explanations underpinning resource curse profoundly 
captures the paradoxical scenario where resource-abundant countries like 
Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Venezuela, 
and similar countries continuously experience low economic development.
However, this is in contrast to the earlier belief that countries blessed with 
natural resources such as oil fossil, etc can base their economic growth and 
design their path to national development and global relevance based on such 
resources (Innis, 1954: 1; Baldwin, 1956: 161). Nigeria falls within the thesis of 
"resource curse" countries as observed by later economists where there exists 
an inverse association between natural resources and economic development. 
Nigeria further falls into a specific description of “oil curse” (Karl, 2005; Ross, 
2011), where, the heavy reliance of its economy on oil over the years fails 
to induce economic growth and national development. Generally, studies by 
Karl (1999), Herbst (2000) and Fearon (2005) show that the “institutional 
weaknesses” that afflict resource-plenty countries like Nigeria are attributed 
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to the “rentier effect” that fuels mal-administration and corruption by political 
elites who manipulate the politico-administrative processes for selfish gains.
These postulations on the resource curse thesis have, however, been 
challenged on the basis of some “methodological flaws and neglect of 
stabilising aspects of resource endowment" (Obi, 2010: 488-489). Obi (2010) 
contends that initial "position simplifies what is, in reality, a far more complex 
relationship that is neither inevitable nor normal”. Other scholars also draw a 
link between natural resources and violent conflicts, where resource-dependent 
countries are more likely to experience internal instability and violent 
conflicts than non-resource countries (Collier, 2008; Le Billion, 2001; Mahler, 
2010). Obi (2010), however, observes the influence of powerful “extractive 
transnational forces” and the devious collusion between these forces and 
local political elites. These forces combine to subordinate African resources 
to global capitalist interest to the neglect of local interests. Summing up, Obi 
(2010) argued that oil as a commodity is not the curse, it is rather “cursed” by 
the high premium placed on it by the globalized capitalist forces. 
There is no denying that oil is a blessing to Nigeria as it constitutes the main 
source of the country’s wealth, financing governments’ developmental projects 
at all levels. However, it is more of a curse than a blessing to the generality of 
Nigerians whose lives are trapped in a social relation that benefits successive 
political elites and the transnational capitalist forces (this relationship has been 
ongoing for the past five decades). These are evidenced in the Niger Delta 
protests which is rather a consequence of “unfair” distribution of oil benefits; 
and the demand for better conditions of living by Nigerians. All point to the 
failure of successive governments to develop sectoral-linkages, diversify the 
economy and midwife economic development through oil wealth.  In turn, 
these forces continue to exacerbate a lack of confidence in the oil-centric 
political economy, thereby, given rise to a flawed federal system. 
3. Nigeria’s fiscal federalism in perspective
Revenue allocation: Justification and Principles   
In Nigeria, the central government is required by law to collect revenue and 
then share same between itself and the state governments according to some 
agreed formula and principles. The federal government collects import and 
export duties, corporation tax, value-added tax (VAT), excise duties, mining 
rents and royalties, petroleum profit tax, and personal income tax from the 
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armed forces, police and residents of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) and 
the proceeds from these taxes are shared with the states (Babalola, 2019: 91). 
The state and local governments keep their internally generated revenues, 
which are typically less lucrative and not adequate to match their constitutional 
responsibilities. Hence, their perpetual reliance on the federal government. This 
dependence is at the heart of intergovernmental fiscal relations in the country. 
Nigeria has consistently assigned the most lucrative sources of revenue to 
the federal government. Generally, federal governments are empowered to 
collect corporation tax, for example, because, as Anderson (2010: 35) argued, 
the administrative complexity of dealing with corporations that operate in 
many parts of the federation further strengthens the case for centralised, or 
strongly harmonised, design and administration of corporate taxes. Likewise, 
historically, the federal government in Nigeria has always collected customs 
and excise. According to Awa (1976: 65), the reasons for this are both political 
and economic. 
From the political point of view, it is clear that if the units were allowed to impose 
and collect the customs and excise duties, they might do so at differential rates and 
create the impression of having sovereign status vis-à-vis the position of the central 
government. The union might look more like a confederation than a federation. 
From the economic point of view, there is firstly a desire to ensure a uniform rate 
of customs and excise duties and a free flow of commodities among the units. 
There is secondly, an attempt to place in the hands of the federal government a 
reliable source of revenue so that it can, without too much difficulty, meet the 
demands of preserving the territorial integrity of the federation and the internal 
constitutional order.
One reason for allocating the lucrative sources of revenue to the federal 
government is what Babalola (2019: 88) referred to as ‘administrative 
efficiency’. What this means is that taxing powers are assigned to the tier of 
government most likely to administer them efficiently. Another reason for a 
financial arrangement of this nature is that it has been accepted by both the 
centre and the constituent units that the central government deserves the most 
lucrative sources of revenue. This argument is predicated upon the assumption 
that the functions assigned to the federal government require more funds than 
those assigned to the states. This assumption is, however, untenable as such 
subjects as healthcare and education also assigned to the state governments 
require a lot of funding as well.
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As Babalola (2019: 86) argued, if the national economy is to operate at its 
optimum level, and if the federation is to avoid instability, the central government 
must deal with the fiscal imbalance in any state of the federation. Fiscal 
imbalance in one state may have a contagious effect on others. For the purpose 
of horizontal revenue sharing, the revenue allocation system has adopted the 
principles of ‘derivation', ‘need', ‘equality of state', and ‘population' to mention 
a few. The principle of derivation requires the federal government to return to 
the state governments the total, or a proportion, of the revenue generated from 
that state to provide a net benefit for the people of that state (Anderson, 2010: 
54). The principle of ‘need' allows for the allocation of revenues in relation to 
the needs of the people in each state, irrespective of their contribution to total 
national revenues. This principle is tied to that of ‘population’ in the sense that 
population is used as an index of need. In other words, the more the population 
of a state, the more that state gets in revenue from the federation account. The 
principle of ‘equality of states’ is based upon the federal principle that all states 
of the federation are equal. 
Having highlighted the various revenue sharing principles and the rationale 
underpinning the allocation to various tiers of government, we now turn our 
attention to how they have been applied so far. 
Inter-governmental fiscal relations
The story of federalism in Nigeria effectively began in 1954 with the adoption 
of the Federal Constitution. However, the decentralisation of the country’s 
administration began under the unitary Richards Constitution of 1946, which 
signalled the birth of fiscal federalism in Nigeria through the Sydney Phillipson 
fiscal Commission. For horizontal allocation to the then three Regional 
governments (Northern, Western and Eastern Regions), the Commission applied 
the principles of derivation and even progress to share the national revenue as 
follows: Northern Region: 46%; Western Region: 30%; and Eastern Region: 
24% (Ashwe, 1986: 28). Moreover, the central government was allocated the 
lion’s share of the revenue. The Phillipson’s fiscal scheme generated serious 
acrimony among the Regions with the Northern elite alleging that what was 
allocated to the Northern Region was less than it contributed to the central 
revenue and that the Eastern Region was being developed at the expense of 
the Northern Region. Western Regional elite similarly alleged that their region 
received slightly less than its contribution to the central revenue account (May, 
1969: 135). Ironically, the same Constitution that sought to promote the unity of 
the country ended up sowing the seed of future acrimonious intergovernmental 
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relations. The revenue allocation system has since witnessed some changes. 
What has been constant, however, is the assignment of the greater share of 
national revenue to the central government.
The practice of allocating more revenue to the centre was carried forward 
to the post-independence period. For example, the Technical Committee on 
Revenue Allocation appointed by the military administration of Olusegun 
Obasanjo (1976 -79) and chaired by Professor Ojetunji Aboyade recommended 
that the contents of the newly established Federation Account be shared 
vertically between federal, state and local governments in the proportions of 
57%, 30%, and 10% respectively, and 3% as special grants for the mineral 
producing areas (Ashwe, 1986: 35). The Committee’s horizontal sharing 
paid no attention to derivation thus, incurring the wrath of the oil-producing 
states. Similarly, the Babangida administration (1985-93) established National 
Revenue Mobilisation, Allocation and Fiscal Commission (NRMAFC), which 
recommended a vertical sharing order as follows: Federal Government to 
receive 47%; State Governments: 30%; Local Governments: 15%; and Special 
Funds: 8% (Elaigwu, 2007: 243). This recommendation was not acceptable to 
the Federal Military Government (FMG), and it increased its share from 47% 
to 50%, but state and local governments’ shares remained unchanged. Special 
Funds were also reduced from 8% to 5%. The year 1992 also witnessed another 
fiscal adjustment which brought about a decrease in the federal government’s 
share of centrally-collected revenue from 50% to 48.5%, and a reduction in 
the states’ allocation from 30% to 24%, and an increase in local governments 
share from 15% to 20% (Elaigwu, 2007: 245). The local governments were 
the winners in the new scheme because they were provided with more funds to 
take care of their expanded constitutional responsibilities now covering such 
areas as primary education and primary health care. This fiscal arrangement 
was in operation till 1999 when Nigeria returned to civilian rule after long 
years of military rule.
The current 1999 Constitution provides for a vertical sharing of 48.50%, 
24%, 20%, and 7.50% to the federal, states, local governments, and centrally 
controlled special funds, respectively. This sharing formula, no doubt, ensures 
federal dominance, particularly in fiscal matters. Moreover, the arrangement, 
which places mineral resources within the exclusive legislative list, also allows 
the federal government to have the lion’s share of the Federation Account. It is 
therefore not difficult to see why the state and local governments continually 
depend on the centre.
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The principle of derivation is central to the current revenue allocation 
system. According to Section 162(2) of the 1999 Constitution, "the principle 
of derivation shall be constantly reflected in any approved formula as being 
not less than thirteen per cent (13%) of the revenue accruing to the Federation 
Account directly from any natural resources.” In other words, the oil-producing 
states are entitled to 13% of the centrally-generated oil revenue. Derivation 
has ignited the most controversy in the history of revenue sharing in Nigeria. 
For example, between 1946 and 1951, the derivation was 50% while the 1953 
fiscal scheme provided for 100%. Governments of the defunct Northern and 
Western Regions favoured derivation when their respective commodities such 
as groundnuts and cocoa, were experiencing a boom in the global market but 
opposed the principle when oil was found in the Eastern Region. Similarly, 
the Eastern Region that opposed derivation when its main export commodity, 
palm produce declined became a supporter of the principle. The principle was, 
however, relegated when oil revenue became the mainstay of the economy; a 
period that coincided with military rule. This was to the advantage of the federal 
centre. There has been a continuous de-emphasis of the derivation principle 
from 1970 to 1999. In 1970, it was put at 25% and by the end of military rule in 
1999 it came down to 3% (Babalola, 2014: 121). The application of derivation 
has always generated controversy. For example, while the oil-producing states 
clamour for the full implementation of the principle, those opposed to the 
campaign argued that absolute derivation will diminish the financial strength 
of the federal government.
TaBle 1: revenue alloCaTion in nigeria, 1946-1999 
Year Commission/
Committee
Principles & Horizontal 
Allocation
Vertical Allocation Formula
1946 Phillipson i. Derivation
ii. Even progress
Northern Region: 46%
Western Region: 30%
Eastern Region: 24%
1951 Hicks 
Phillipson
i. Derivation
ii. Needs
iii. National interest
iv. Fiscal autonomy
Northern Region: 38%
Western Region: 27.2%
Eastern Region: 34.8%
1953 Chick i. Derivation
ii. Fiscal autonomy
Northern Region: 38%
Western Region: 27.2%
Eastern Region: 34.8%
Southern Cameroon 1%
1958 Raisman i. Derivation
ii. Fiscal autonomy
iii. Balanced development
Northern Region: 40%
Western Region: 24%
Eastern Region: 31%
Southern Cameroon 5%
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1964 Binns i. Derivation
ii. Fiscal autonomy
iii. Balanced development
Northern Region: 42%
Western Region: 20%
Eastern Region: 30%
Mid-Western Region 8%
1977 Aboyade Equality of access 25%;
National minimum standard: 22%
Absorptive capacity: 20%
Independent revenue 18%
Fiscal efficiency: 15%
Federal Govt. 57% 
State Govts.  30%
Local Govts.   10%
Special Grants Account 3%
1980 Okigbo Minimum responsibility of govt. 40%
Population: 40%
Social development factor 15%
Internal revenue effort: 5%
Federal Govt.   53%
State Govts.  30%
Local Govts.   10%
Special Fund 7%
1981 1981 Act Equality of State: 40%
Population: 40%
Social development factor 15%
Internal Revenue 5%
Federal Govt.   55%
State Govts.  30.5%
Local Govts.   10%
Ecological Problem 1%
Devt. of mineral producing areas 1.5% 
Derivation 2%
1989 RMAFC 
(Danjuma)
Equality of State: 40%
Population: 30%
Social development factor 10%
Internal Revenue 20%
Federal Govt.  47%
State Govts.  30%
Local Govts.  15%
FCT: 1%
Stabilisation: 0.5%
Savings: 2.0%
Derivation 2%
Devt. of mineral producing areas 1.5%
Devt. of non-oil producing areas 0.5%
General Ecology: 0.5%
1990 RMAFC Equality of State: 40%
Population: 30%
Social development 10%
Landmass 10%
Internal Revenue 10%
Federal Govt.   50%
State Govts.  30%
Local Govts.   15%
FCT: 1%
Stabilisation: 0.5%
Derivation 1%
Devt. of oil-mineral producing areas 1.5%
General Ecology: 0.5%
1992 RMAFC Equality of State: 40%
Population: 30%
Social development 10%
Landmass 10%
Internal Revenue 10%
Federal Govt.   48.5%
State Govts.  24%
Local Govts.   20%
FCT: 1%
Stabilisation: 0.5%
Derivation 1%
Devt. of oil-mineral producing areas 3%
General Ecology 2%
1999 RMAFC Equality of State: 40%
Population: 30%
Social development 10%
Landmass 10%
Internal Revenue 10%
Federal Govt.  48.5%
State Govts. 24%
Local Govts.  20%
Special Funds 7.50%
Source: Various Revenue Allocation Commission Reports (1946-1999)
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4. Resource curse and the dilemma of fiscal federalism
As mentioned earlier, Nigeria exemplifies a country afflicted with resource 
curse. The discovery of oil in the hitherto agrarian economy gave birth to 
an oil-centric economy. Contemporary Nigeria's economic fortunes now 
revolve around the production and sale of oil. According to Rimmer (1978), 
oil changed Nigeria from a country exporting diverse primary products into 
what is sometimes called a monoculture, with over 90 per cent of export 
earnings contributed by this one commodity. Recent research also shows that 
oil accounts for about 95 per cent of Nigeria's total foreign exchange earnings 
and generates over 40 per cent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(Ejobowah: 2010: 265). 
Nigeria is one of the most oil-dependent countries in the world. This 
dependence effectively goes back to the global oil boom of 1973, when 
Nigeria and other oil-exporting countries witnessed a boom in oil revenue. The 
country’s political and economic fate has since then been inextricably linked to 
oil. Nigeria has other sources of revenue like corporation tax, value-added tax 
(VAT) and personal income tax, but oil revenue is the dominant source of the 
country’s wealth. Oil has played a dominant role in the economy over the years 
accounting for more than 85% of the country’s foreign exchange earnings. It 
also provides the fiscal basis of the country as annual budgets at all levels of 
government are predicated upon the projected annual production and the price 
of crude oil in the international oil market. 
Despite the huge inflow of oil revenue into the economy, Nigeria is still one 
of the under-performing countries in the world and state governments continue 
to experience fiscal imbalance. The injection of funds into an economy tends 
to lead to an increase in national income, which expectedly leads to an increase 
in domestic demand and supply, but the opposite is the case in Nigeria. 
Since Nigeria’s economy thrives on oil rents, domestic production becomes 
insignificant. Oil-generated revenue is not ploughed back into productive 
economic activities but spent either on foreign manufactured commodities or 
diverted into private use by state officials. This clearly explains why Nigeria 
has been described as a country characterised by “Want in the midst of plenty” 
(ICG, 2006). 
As explained earlier, there is a link between a federation’s political economy 
and how the overall federal system is operated. Nigeria’s oil-driven economy 
is intrinsically linked to the fiscal system. As we have shown, the oil boom of 
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the early 1970s contributed to the highly centralised character of the federal 
system. It also increased the centrality of oil in the country’s revenue allocation 
system. As Babalola (2019: 71) argued, as oil rents flow into the national 
revenue pot, the government at the centre continues to be centralised, and 
consequently, the states continue to be financially dependent on the federal 
centre. There is also an inseparable link between oil resources and politics. 
Rather than spur economic growth and national development, oil becomes 
a ready means of politico-economic control and source of primitive wealth 
accumulation by the political elites. The country’s political leaders have failed 
to utilise the enormous oil proceeds to build a viable economic base to sustain 
the growing population (Okafor, 2016: 22). The country is currently facing 
a development crisis with severe attendant socio-economic implications of 
low economic growth, high poverty rate and unemployment. This scenario of 
poverty in the midst of resource plenty has contributed to the current agitations 
for the implementation of true fiscal federalism in the country.
Since oil-generated revenue is exclusively concentrated at the centre, the 
state and local governments are left with no option but to solicit for handouts 
from the centre. Rather than for the different tiers of government to financially 
co-ordinate with each other, the state and local governments are dependent 
on the federal government. State governments, for example, generate revenue 
from personal income tax and other sources while local governments generate 
revenue from liquor sales, birth and death registrations, environmental 
violations and fines, motor parking dues, and market stalls dues. These 
sources are many but they are usually inadequate to match the sub-national 
governments’ assigned functions.
Of course, the state governments’ inability to secure the lion’s share of 
the contents of the Federation Account is not solely responsible for their 
failure to meet their constitutional responsibilities but this is a contributing 
factor. The lack of fiscal capacity for service delivery may also be found in 
the systemic corruption that pervades state governments. With massive oil 
wealth, rent-seeking becomes a culture in the country. Oil rents provide some 
form of opportunities for the governing elite who compete among themselves 
for control of the states and its resources. In Nigeria, politicians see office 
holding as an opportunity for phenomenal illicit gain. For example, owing 
to the implementation of the derivation principle in the current democratic 
dispensation, the oil-producing states have witnessed a dramatic surge in 
federal transfer. However, as Babalola (2014) who expounds the corruption-
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underdevelopment nexus in the Niger Delta region argued, the systemic 
corruption among regional leaders have eroded the supposed gains from the 
oil economy. There is a persisting poor condition of living in the area and basic 
social services such as education and health are grossly underfunded.
It is obvious that the states are not comfortable with the dominance of the 
central government in fiscal distribution. Many of them are not economically 
viable and cannot survive without constant federal handouts. As mentioned 
earlier, their annual internally generated revenue (IGR) is usually low, yet, 
there is no appreciable response from them. The monthly regular handouts 
from the centre have contributed to the culture of indolence among political 
leaders at the state level. This has, in turn, contributed to the excessive pressure 
on the Federation Account. Nevertheless, mention must be made of some 
states’ efforts to bolster their IGR. For example, the Lagos state government’s 
partnership with the Kebbi state government to boost rice production (Lake 
Rice) is a positive response. Kebbi is endowed with vast arable land suitable 
for rice production while Lagos has the needed financial and industrial capacity 
to facilitate the production process. This partnership has not only improved the 
food security situation in both states, but it has also created jobs and increased 
the two states’ IGR. Ebonyi state too has also revitalised its moribund rice 
production plant at Abakaliki. Likewise, in a bid to boost the state’s economy, 
the Osun state government has also revived its cocoa processing plant at Ede. 
These positive responses are worthy of emulation by other states to bolster 
their income and economy as against the persisting ugly trend of continuously 
looking unto the centre.
5. Conclusion
This paper has shown that the negative relationship between Nigeria’s colossal 
oil wealth and poor economic performance explains why oil is a curse to the oil-
rich federation and a source of despondency to the people who are constantly 
wallowing in poverty. Nigeria’s over-dependence on oil has contributed to the 
curse. The vulnerability of the domestic economy to price fluctuations in the 
international oil market is not in question. Whenever oil revenue declines so do 
Nigeria’s government expenditure. For instance, the global oil price crash of 
the 1980s resulted in economic hardship in oil exporting countries, including 
Nigeria. Similarly, the drastic reduction in oil price from about $100 in 2013-
2014 to $40 in the first half of 2015 created a big upset in the national budget 
and subsequent public expenditure, which in turn led to economic recession.
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Nigeria’s over-dependence on oil is one of the causes of the states’ lack of 
economic viability. Therefore, the country’s fiscal federalism should emphasise 
revenue generation rather than revenue distribution, as this will ensure the fiscal 
viability of the states. The current practice in which states rely almost solely 
on the centre, even for their recurrent expenditure is antithetical to economic 
growth. Dependence on the Federation Account will continue until the states 
develop their own independent revenue sources. One way to do this is to revive 
the agricultural sector at all levels. In the immediate post-independence period, 
for example, agriculture constituted the country's economic backbone but the 
unprecedented flow of oil rents caused agricultural products to become less 
profitable. It is on record that Nigeria’s agricultural products in 1962 accounted 
for about 70 per cent of the total export value, but by 1974, a year after the oil 
boom, agriculture’s share of total export earnings had dropped to less than 20 
per cent, whereas petroleum’s share of the total earnings accounted for only 10 
per cent of export earnings in 1962, but rose to 82.7 per cent in 1973 (Bangura 
et al., 1986: 177). Also, according to the GTI Research Report (2015: 10), in 
the 1960’s, agriculture contributed up to 64% to the total GDP but gradually 
declined in the 70’s to 48% and the trend continued in 1980 to 20% and 19% 
in 1985 as a result of the oil boom of the1970's. It is thus, clear from these 
statistics that the performance of the agricultural sector and specifically the 
export potential of these cash crops took a downward movement with the oil 
boom of the 1970s. 
Moreover, the culture of fiscal dependence in which the states depend heavily 
on centrally-collected revenues, no doubt negatively affects the states’ internally 
generated revenue. Considering the functions expected to be performed by the 
state governments, the existing vertical sharing formula needs to be reviewed 
to ensure that the federal government’s share of the Federation Account is 
reduced and that of the states is increased. Another means through which the 
states’ revenue may be enhanced is by increasing the current 13% derivation. 
It must, however, be argued that, if the objective of  fiscal federalism is to 
achieve a balanced federation and national economic growth, then absolute 
derivation, which has the tendency to exacerbate regional fiscal disparity, may 
not be feasible. That said, an upward review of the existing formula may be 
considered as this will enhance the financial strength of the oil-producing states. 
The fiscal system also needs reviewing in such a way that oil revenue is used 
to generate some linkages in the economy. In Nigeria, the economic linkage 
between oil production and the domestic economy is very insignificant. The 
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inflow of oil-generated funds into the economy has not translated into high 
national income because these funds are not ploughed back into economic 
activities. Rather than invest these funds in the manufacturing sector, for 
example, policymakers spend them on importation, consequently constituting 
a leakage from the economy. As Babalola (2019: 68) observed, another 
explanation for this lack of linkage-effect is that resources are often extracted 
by foreign investors, who repatriate their profits to their home countries rather 
than invest in the economy where the profits were made. Therefore, such a 
sector as mining needs to be regulated to the benefit of the national economy.
Finally, if the states are to be self-financing, if they are to enjoy some 
measure of fiscal autonomy, the fiscal system has to be decentralised in such a 
way that the states have relative control over their resources. Decentralisation 
of economic resources will ultimately reduce their dependence on the federal 
government. As presently constituted, Nigeria’s federal centre is overloaded. In 
addition to the above “prescriptions”, governments at all levels must maintain 
disciplined fiscal policies.
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